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Paul Weiler's Medical Malpractice on Trial' is a splendid little book. In 161 very readable pages (plus sixty-eight pages of
endnotes), he describes and critiques the current regime of medical
malpractice law, surveys and evaluates a range of reforms previously proposed (and sometimes enacted), and offers a bold improvement package of his own. His most inventive and promising
ideas are to substitute organizational liability (such as hospital liability) for individual physician liability (pp 122-32) and to replace
fault-based compensation with a no-fault scheme covering all medical accidents that lead to serious disability or death (pp 132-58).
Weiler tempers the boldness of his vision with a sensitive appreciation of both the political and practical problems of promptly
achieving it. This appreciation leads him to advocate the immediate adoption of more modest steps in the direction he favors, including substantial changes in the measure of damages in malpractice cases and experiments with elective no-fault compensation in
lieu of litigation.
Although I am persuaded that Weiler's recommendations
would lead to a vast improvement over the current regime, he has
not yet shown, as I will later explain, that his focused no-fault plan
is the best long-range solution. Even so, I think this slim volume is
a "must" for anyone who wants to understand contemporary issues
surrounding medical malpractice. Medical Malpractice on Trial
contains countless nuggets of information and analysis concerning
t Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall). Ellen R. Auriti
provided considerable assistance in the preparation of this review.
' Paul C. Weiler, Medical Malpracticeon Trial (Harvard, 1991). All parenthetical page
numbers in the text and footnotes refer to this text.
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a dazzling array of issues and contentions that have been featured
in the debate over medical malpractice reform during the past
twenty years. In the course of his presentation, Weiler pulls together nearly all of the best work by others who have written in
this field.,
Moreover, this book integrates the findings and analyses of
two large and important projects for which Weiler has been centrally responsible. This information is otherwise only accessible in
more awkward forms. While there is much to be gained from reading the more than 1,000-page final Reporters' Study of Enterprise
Liability for PersonalInjury (1991) for the American Law Institute2 ("Reporters' Study") (which covers many other topics besides
malpractice) and Patients,Doctors, and Lawyers: Medical Injury,
Malpractice Litigation, and Patient Compensation in New York
(1990)3 ("HarvardStudy")(the massive first report of the Harvard
Medical Malpractice Study Group), Weiler's book is the place to
start for a well organized and compact examination of the medical
malpractice field.
I.

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MALPRACTICE LAW, AND MALPRACTICE
INSURANCE TODAY

A. Patterns of Claiming and Collecting
Weiler paints a startling picture of current patterns of claiming and collecting which reveals the minor and idiosyncratic role
malpractice law plays in the compensation of malpractice victims.
Based on the Harvard Study, Weiler explains that of every 100,000
patients discharged from hospitals, nearly 4,000 suffered an "adverse event ' 4 from their medical treatment. About one-fourth of
these are the result of medical malpractice (p 12). In short, hospital patients on average run about a four percent risk of an adverse
event and about a one percent risk of medical malpractice.
These 100,000 patient discharges and 1,000 malpracticecaused injuries generate about 125 legal claims. About sixty of the
125 claimants actually receive compensation (p 13). The rest of the
2 Reporters' Study of Enterprise Liability for PersonalInjury (ALI, 1991) ("Reporters' Study").
S Harvard Medical Practice Study Group, Patients,Doctors, and Lawyers: Medical In-

jury, Malpractice Litigation, and Patient Compensation in New York (Harvard, 1990)
("HarvardStudy").
' In the Harvard Study, a hospital occurrence counted as an adverse event if it prolonged the patient's stay in the hospital by at least one day or caused the patient's death (p
13).
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claims lose at trial or are dropped. Of those sixty successful claimants, about twenty receive payment before they have filed a lawsuit, about thirty-five after a suit is filed but before (or during)
trial, and only about five win at trial (pp 53, 193 n 30).
According to neutral physicians reviewing the records, however, of every 125 claims that plaintiffs make, no malpractice occurred in about eighty-five cases. Based on Weiler's account and
the Harvard study, I have calculated that most of the cases where
malpractice occurred and a patient filed a claim lead to some
award (thirty to thirty-five of forty); but some thirty percent of the
claims where malpractice apparently did not occur also result in
some payment (twenty-five to thirty of eighty-five), albeit a payment that is often substantially discounted from the amount of the
claimant's likely recovery had liability been clear.
To put it in a somewhat different way, about thirty to thirtyfive of every 1,000 malpractice victims use the legal system to obtain compensation for their losses, although only perhaps four out
of every 1,000 obtain an award of individualized justice through a
jury of their peers. At the same time, twenty-five to thirty people
who were probably not victims of malpractice nevertheless receive
payment from the system. In some cases these people probably
have not even suffered any harm or a net detriment to health as a
result of the medical treatment they complained about.
I've so far used the illustrative numbers of 1,000 tort victims
out of every 100,000 hospital discharges in order to provide a ready
feel for the data. In fact, we are talking about some forty million
annual hospitalizations across America (p 71). These numbers
translate into about a million and a half adverse events and
400,000 torts (one percent of 40 million) every year. Yet, the system's compensation shortfall is enormous: only 25,000 medical
malpractice claimants, out of 50,000 who claim and 400,000 who
are injured, are likely to receive some compensation, of whom only
12,500 to 15,000 were actually malpractice victims.5 Of course,
many of those patients injured through medical malpractice suffer
only minor injuries, about half incurring only minimal impairment
and recovering completely within a month, and another substantial
group fully recovering in less than six months (p 136). Still, in as
' Torts are also committed in doctors' offices-13% of malpractice claims arise out of
conduct in doctors' offices as compared with 81% from hospitalizations and the rest from
other locations such as nursing homes (pp 225-26 n 18). We know a lot less, however, about
how often torts occur outside of hospitals and hence less about the proportion of those so
injured who actually claim and recover.
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many as twenty-five percent of the cases of medical negligence the
patient dies-at least in part as a result of malpractice.6 In addition, about ten percent of the victims of medical malpractice suffer
long-lasting disabilities. Projecting the findings nationally, the
Harvard Study suggests that every year the approximately 1.5 million adverse events from medical treatment in hospitals seriously
and permanently disable approximately 150,000 people and kill
more than 150,000 people (many of whom, admittedly, are elderly
and perhaps frail at the outset).8 Medical negligence accounts for
greater than a quarter of those more than 300,000 substantial
harms, only a small portion of which are actually compensated
through the current tort system.
B.

Administrative Costs, Insurance, and Other Burdens

Weiler also rightly emphasizes the enormous waste of the existing regime. In order to deliver $1 in net compensation into the
hands of those medical malpractice claimants who receive something from the system, more than $1.35 is spent on claims processing costs. The legal expenses of both sides are the most significant
costs." And these figures don't even count the substantial additional transactions costs not directly attributable to claims
processing, including commissions, marketing expenses, and taxes
paid and profits earned by insurers, all of which probably amount
to more than twenty percent of the cost of medical liability insurance (pp 192-93 n 28).
In states still following the common law rules as to tort damages, forty to fifty percent of the compensation paid is for pain and
suffering (pp 51, 55), the lion's share of which is concentrated on
the five percent of successful claimants with the most serious injuries (who represent perhaps two or three of every 1,000 victims of
8

7
8

Harvard Study at 6-21, table 6.5 (cited in note 3).
Id at 6-25, table 6.5.
I define the seriously disabled category more broadly than Weiler does. Weiler men-

tions 30,000 seriously disabled people (p 12), but based on the report of the Harvard Study
Group this figure must refer to people in the most severe disability category. The Harvard
Study found that 9% of those suffering adverse events were disabled for more than six
months and 14% died. Harvard Study at 6-1 (cited in note 3). Between 2% and 3% were
permanently disabled with a disability rating of more than 50%. Id at 6-21, table 6.5. This
puts the number killed in excess of 150,000, the number disabled for more than six months
in the range of 150,000, and those in the most seriously disabled category at about 40,000
annually. Weiler notes that those not able to return to work within six months approached a
quarter, numbering around 375,000, of the total annual number of adverse events (p 136).
9 See James S. Kakalik and Nicholas M. Pace, Costs and Compensation Paid in Tort
Litigation (Rand Institute for Civil Justice, 1986).
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malpractice) (p 48). Moreover, of the remaining compensation paid
through the legal system, perhaps as much as sixty percent is already covered by public and private insurance programs like Blue
Cross and other forms of private health insurance, Medicare,
Medicaid, Social Security, disability insurance, sick leave, and so
on (p 51).
A little arithmetic, then, shows that for every one dollar that is
collected in malpractice insurance premiums, ten to fifteen cents
has traditionally gone to reimburse claimants' actual out-of-pocket
economic losses. Furthermore, delays of several years between the
time of claim filing and receipt of compensation are not at all uncommon (p 52).
Physicians, hospitals, and others paid a total of about $7 billion in medical liability insurance premiums in 1988. Weiler's data
illustrates that around $1 billion of that amount will finally go to
reimburse otherwise uncompensated economic losses. Claimants
will actually probably receive a net cash total of between $2 and $3
billion (p 99), depending upon how successful "collateral" sources
(private and social insurance funds) are in recouping what otherwise would amount to double recovery by claimants.
The financial impact of the system on certain classes of physicians is enormous. For example, high-risk specialists like
neurosurgeons and obstetricians in high-risk states like New York
and Florida pay annual medical malpractice insurance premiums
of between $100,000 and $200,000 (p 4). Still, as Weiler makes
clear, the insurance burdens should not be over-dramatized since
the national average malpractice insurance cost per doctor was
only about $16,000 in 1988; the $7 billion in malpractice premiums
paid in 1988 represented not much more than one percent of total
annual expenditures for health care nationwide that year (p 4).
To this cost, however, one must add at least some of the $9 or
$10 billion spent annually by physicians on "defensive" medicine,
in the form of extra record-keeping, extra tests given to patients,
extra time with patients and the like (p 85). Of course, some of
those dollars might actually have benefitted patients and are costjustified in an economic sense. But it is widely believed that many
of these defensive measures do not help patients (and sometimes
are even risky to patients); they serve primarily to help the doctor
ward off malpractice claims (and, frequently, to increase the doctor's income as well) (p 87).
Additional social costs of the existing legal system include (1)
the psychological burden on those doctors who feel they are caught
up in a Kafkaesque legal system (p 81), (2) the refusal of compe-
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tent physicians to enter or continue practice in certain high-risk
specialties or to perform certain desirable but higher risk treatments (p 85), and (3) the lost services of and earnings by doctors
who must devote up to an average of five uncompensated days to
defend against a typical malpractice claim (p 81). So, while the
"costs" generated by legal liability for medical malpractice do not
loom large in the overall national health care budget, they are
plainly not chicken feed.
In sum, from the viewpoint of compensating victims, whether
we focus only on victims of malpractice or on all victims of adverse
events from medical treatment, Weiler's analysis demonstrates
that the current system is a disaster and a disgrace. The few are
lucky lottery winners, so to speak, only about half of whom should
even have been given lottery tickets. The many are ignored. Although it may not be fair to say that "only the lawyers win," it can
hardly be said that, from the compensation perspective, patients as
a class win.
C.

Individualized Justice?

The system, overall, also fails to serve well the ideal of individual justice. As Weiler demonstrates, on the patient side, most "deserving" victims, those who have been wronged, get nothing, and
only a trivial proportion of wronged victims have the satisfaction
(if it turns out to be that) of winning in court. At the same time,
many successful claimants are not "deserving" in the sense of having been wronged.
On the defendant side, physicians generally do not pay higher
malpractice insurance premiums because of successful malpractice
claims against them. Rather, rates turn far more importantly on
the number and size of claims against other doctors practicing the
same specialty and in the same region (p 76).
Because nearly all the claims are either settled or dropped,
"blame" as assigned by the current system is both highly selective
and often misapplied. Insurance companies settle many undeserving claims for their nuisance value, often irritating the physicians
involved (p 15). And while doctors are actually vindicated about
half of the time in court (p 168 n 8), victory in litigation is hardly
the sort of justice they crave. (At the same time, some of those
doctors who win at trial probably did commit malpractice, but win
because of a lack of evidence, or a jury that is overly sympathetic
to or awed by them.)
Meanwhile, most "malpractice" in the legal system turns out
to be the sort of momentary slip of the hand that most people fre-
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quently display (p 14). Unfortunately, in risky medical treatment
settings those momentary errors can be extremely harmful. While
we might agree that people victimized by these sorts of errors are
in some sense "entitled" to better care, an error of this sort hardly
makes someone a bad person, let alone a bad doctor. Contrary to
widespread belief, repeat offenders are actually responsible for a
small share of the malpractice that occurs (p 79). A truer picture is
that a large number of doctors regularly commit errors that are in
theory avoidable, and only some of these doctors are unlucky
enough to have those errors lead to significant patient harm.
D.

Prevention

Weiler concludes, and I agree, that if the current legal system
covering medical malpractice can be justified at all, it must be because of its role in preventing medical accidents by deterring acts
of malpractice that would otherwise occur (p 71). Of course, even if
the present scheme had some positive impact on physician conduct, that would hardly end the inquiry. Alternative deterrence
strategies would also have to be considered.
Weiler addresses the prevention issue in his marvelously helpful Chapter 4. Weiler believes that the existing malpractice regime
does aid patient safety (p 91). But he concludes that certain reforms would do better not only on this dimension, but also on
other dimensions (such as better victim compensation, lower administrative costs, and less harm to physicians and medical practice) (p 132). However, the goal of accident prevention remains
central to Weiler's victim compensation reforms.
By contrast, I believe that the right strategy is to move toward
the separation of the behavioral control and compensation functions-which, as I will explain, would take us away from both the
current malpractice scheme and Weiler's favored alternative.
II.

TRACK ONE REFORMS: SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN THE

TRADITIONAL LEGAL REGIME

Weiler calls for reform along two tracks. Track two involves
moving to what he calls "no-fault liability" for medical accidents. I
will discuss this approach in the next section. Track one, my focus
here, involves what he terms "serious reform" of the traditional
system.
Weiler generally eschews doctrinal reform concerning the standard of care that physicians owe their patients. He quickly dismisses alternative dispute resolution procedures, like screening

-
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panels (p 42). Instead, he concentrates on damages law. In Weiler's
prescription, successful medical malpractice plaintiffs should not
receive compensation for losses covered by "collateral sources" (pp
47-54) and should have reduced recovery for pain and suffering (pp
54-61). In return, they should receive compensation for their attorney's fees (pp 61-69).
In favoring such a trade, Weiler basically endorses the solution
that Professor Jeffrey O'Connell and I have recommended previously for personal injury cases generally-although, in the details,
there are perhaps some important differences among us. 10
A. Reversing the "Collateral Sources" Rule
Weiler, O'Connell, and I all favor a general reversal of the
common law rule that ignores other "collateral" sources of compensation for the same loss when determining the amount of a victim's award in a tort case (pp 50-52). Weiler does not pay much
attention, however, to the details of just which collateral sources
should count in reducing what otherwise would be the victim's
malpractice award.
I assume Weiler would agree with me that a plaintiff should
not recover in a lawsuit for losses already covered by social insurance or public assistance benefits or by basic work-related employee benefits, like health insurance. I also assume that Weiler
10 O'Connell's proposed trades came in two sequential proposals that I have combined
into a single recommendation for the purposes of this review. See Jeffrey O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Contributoryand ComparativeFault,with Compensatory Savings by Also
Abolishing the CollateralSource Rule, 1979 U ill L F 591; Jeffrey O'Connell, A Proposalto
Abolish Defendants' Payment for Pain and Suffering in Return for Payment of Claimants'
Attorneys' Fees, 1981 U Ill L Rev 333; Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away With Personal
Injury Law 167 (Quorum, 1989); and Stephen D. Sugarman, Serious Tort Law Reform, 24
San Diego L Rev 795 (1987).
Apart from issues discussed in the text, O'Connell and I both proposed that, as part of
the trade, plaintiffs should gain an additional advantage through the elimination of the defense of plaintiff fault. Victim fault would constitute neither a complete bar to recovery, as
in the common law regime, nor grounds for a reduced recovery, as is the case under modern
comparative fault systems now in place in most states. Weiler does not include this change
in his package. Of course, in medical malpractice cases, plaintiff fault is rarely an issue
anyway, so this difference among us has little consequence in the malpractice context.
I would also have plaintiffs give up some access to punitive damages by making their
availability and amount a matter for the judge, rather than the jury, to decide. This rule
would bring punitive damages law in personal injury cases closer to the practice in civil
rights law where a judge will often award large attorneys' fees in class action cases which
expose and bring to justice especially bad conduct by the defendants. Weiler does not address the issue of punitive damages in his book, perhaps for the sensible reason that it has
played relatively little role in the medical malpractice field. The Reporters' Study calls for
restraints on the award of punitive damages. Reporters' Study at 231-65 (cited in note 2).
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would agree that malpractice law should continue to ignore the victim's savings and personally-purchased, permanent life insurance,
even though they too are available to replace the losses incurred.
After all, reversing the collateral sources rule isn't really meant to
turn tort law into a means-tested compensation scheme.
Rather, the justification for the proposal is to channel the responsibility for the compensation into broadly applicable and far
more cheaply administered first party loss insurance schemes and
away from third party liability insurance which is so costly to administer. Yet, even given this general rationale, it is rather difficult
to decide what to do about things such as disability insurance, especially when individually purchased by the victim outside the job
context; and term life insurance, especially when automatically
provided to all employees by the victim's employer. These are close
questions that several state legislatures have already recognized in
their attempts to turn the general pronouncements of law professors (and others) about the collateral sources rule into specific statutory provisions.' 1
Weiler contrasts the reversal of the collateral sources rule with
the imposition of an overall ceiling on malpractice awards (p 51),
an approach, he notes, that has been followed in a few states (p
49). He opposes the latter, and I agree, because it bites most in the
relatively few cases with the greatest loss (p 50). Reversing the collateral sources rule, by contrast, concentrates malpractice payments on cases of greater need.
B.

Limiting and Standardizing Recovery for Pain and Suffering

Weiler, O'Connell, and I have somewhat divergent views with
respect to tort compensation for pain and suffering. O'Connell's favored solution is to eliminate it altogether." I do not favor that
solution, at least for now, partly because it may be thought to
represent too sharp a break with tradition, partly because of my
empathy with the outrage that may be felt by those very seriously
harmed through the fault of another, and partly because even
workers' compensation law tends to pay some arbitrarily selected
amounts to those who suffer serious permanent impairments.
Therefore, I propose retaining tort recovery for pain and suffering, also called "general damages," but in a quite restricted

" More attention is given to the details of reversing the collateral sources rule in 2
Reporters' Study at 161-82 (cited in note 2).
12 O'Connell, 1981 U Ill L Rev at 341 (cited in note 10).
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form. First, no one could recover general damages who had not suffered a serious injury, defined as involving either a disability that
prevents one from returning to one's normal activities for more
than six months, or a significant and permanent impairment or
disfigurement. The idea is to eliminate payments to those claimants who now milk the defendant for the nuisance value of their
claim, those claimants who feign or exaggerate soft tissue injuries,
and, candidly, those who may well have suffered immediately following their injury, but who, by the time of trial, no longer have
significant residual suffering from the accident.
This threshold is broadly based on the threshold employed by
the Michigan auto no-fault scheme. It is intended, if applied to all
torts cases, to bar the general damages claims of more than threequarters of those now receiving some compensation for pain and
suffering. In the medical malpractice context, however, one would
expect proportionately fewer pain and suffering claims to be
barred. This result is expected because the difficulties and expense
of medical malpractice litigation already serve to exclude from the
system a fairly large proportion of small injury cases.
Second, I propose a ceiling on pain and suffering recovery. It
would be set at $150,000 (in 1988 dollars) and would grow with
inflation.'" Weiler rejects a ceiling of the sort I've proposed on the
ground that it arbitrarily imposes reduced recovery only on those
who have been most seriously injured (pp 55-56). Yet, in practice,
as I will shortly explain, I would hope that my proposal could work
very much like the considerably more sophisticated regime that
Weiler offers.
Weiler favors the creation of a "scale" (pp 58-61). A scale is
not the same as a schedule which would attempt to establish in
advance a certain dollar sum for every sort of injury. Instead, the
scale would assign so many dollars for each of a selected array of
injuries. The top of the scale would be reserved for the most serious non-fatal injuries-such as an infant blinded or made
quadriplegic at birth (p 59). Other representative and less serious
injuries would also appear on the scale, to which lesser dollar
amounts of recovery would attach. In addition, the scale would
take into account the age of the victim and hence the number of
years of suffering ahead (id). The parties (in settlement negotiations) and juries and judges (in cases that go to trial) would be told
Is O'Connell's

fallback position is less restrictive than mine. Were the legislature not to

abolish pain and suffering awards altogether, his alternative statutory language would impose a threshold similar to mine, but no ceiling. Id at 350.
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about the scale and would seek to locate their claims at an appropriate place along it (pp 59-60).
As Weiler well recognizes, a scale (as well as a schedule) would
in fact contain its own ceiling. But Weiler says that the way existing ceilings work is that juries, unaware of the ceiling, decide on
the amount of common law damages to which the victim is entitled. Afterwards, the judge simply applies the cap (p 59). This process results in a range of injuries of quite different degrees of severity being treated alike at the top (p 59).
Caps need not work that way, however. Suppose instead,
judges, juries and litigators were told that the purpose of the cap is
to serve as the highest point on Weiler's scale-as a sum reserved
for the most serious and long-lasting harms only-with lesser injuries to receive appropriately lower amounts. With that understanding, the two schemes might well function much alike, although I
concede that Weiler's proposal holds the promise of greater consistency among cases falling along the scale. The real dispute between
us here is the comparative advantage, if any, of rule-making over
individual adjudication. In this context, the English common law
judges seem to have developed a de facto scale, without formally
adopting one through the rule-making process Weiler proposes.14
In any event, Weiler and I seem close here in principle, if not in
administrative detail.
Another key point of agreement is that in order to reach even
the bottom of Weiler's scale, the plaintiff would have to suffer at
least the sort of serious injury I described in discussing my proposed threshold (pp 59-60).
A possibly important difference between us is the current dollar value to be awarded for pain and suffering in the most serious
injury cases and, in turn, the amount to be awarded along the scale
to all seriously injured victims with valid claims. That is, Weiler
might find my inflation-adjusted $150,000 rather too low as the top
of his scale, although he is a bit coy on this question.
My idea is to provide enough money so that the most seriously
injured victims could invest the award and comfortably earn the
arbitrary sum of $1,000 a month in 1988 dollars-an amount that
would significantly benefit most Americans, but would not make
anyone rich. Given modest inflation and lowered interest rates
since 1988, the $150,000 figure might be raised to $200,000 today.
Weiler first argues that the point of the pain and suffering
award should be to allow the person to adjust socially and psycho14

But, of course, English personal injury cases generally do not use juries.

1510

The University of Chicago Law Review

[58:1499

logically to his or her condition, just as the other damages awarded
address medical and vocational adjustment (p 58). He emphasizes
the, importance of inquiring whether the award really can be used
to pay for things that would further those social and psychological
goals (id). Yet, it is not clear that he favors individualized inquiries
along these lines. He gives an example of a hobbyist piano player
and a hobbyist chess player each losing a hand, suggesting that,
other things being equal, the piano player should get a larger payment (pp 60-61). But this illustration seems primarily to emphasize differences in lost enjoyment from similar injuries, not so
much a difference in what each person needs to adjust, unless he
has in mind the pianist taking lessons to learn how to play pieces
written for one hand. So, too, when he suggests that a blind or
quadriplegic child should be at the top of his scale (p 59), he really
doesn't justify this suggestion in terms of appropriate spending for
social and psychological adjustment, but rather, it seems, in terms
of the enormity of these injuries.
As a result, Weiler's analysis, like mine, provides no real basis
for determining the range of the scale, and, like mine, his solution
would involve a certain arbitrariness. At one point Weiler says that
under his plan the amount paid at the ceiling "would likely fall
well within the range of the statutory damage caps recently
adopted by the state legislatures" (p 58). I find this statement ambiguous. Does he have in mind as the range Maryland's $350,000
limit and New Hampshire's $875,000?15 Is California's $250,000
cap in medical malpractice cases, adopted in the 1970s, 16 "recent"
enough? While Weiler's discussion leaves me thinking that the top
of his scale might approach $500,000, I note that he also favorably
cites the Canadian approach in which the scale tops out at about
$200,000 Canadian (close to my recommendation) (pp 58, 195-96 n
45).
C.

Paying Successful Plaintiffs' Legal Fees

Weiler, O'Connell, and I all agree that successful claimants
should be entitled to reasonable legal fees as part of their damage
award, and that losing claimants should not be obligated to pay
the legal fees of defendants (pp 66-67). Frivolous claims aside,
16Md Cts & Jud Pro Code Ann § 11-108 (1989); NH Rev Stat Ann § 508:4-d (Equity,
Supp 1990).
16 Cal Civil Code § 3333.2 (West, Supp 1991).
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bringing a lawsuit is not a tort, and, given the current tort system,
the cost of defending against non-frivolous claims seems fairly a
part of the cost of the practice of medicine. By contrast, requiring
the defendant to pay for those real costs incurred by winning
plaintiffs seems just. This sense of justice is especially clear because the proposed changes would reduce recovery for pain and
suffering and collateral sources-damages that are well understood, as a practical matter, to provide the money to pay for the
plaintiff's lawyer.
I propose that plaintiffs who win at trial normally be awarded
legal fees calculated as a declining percentage of the rest of their
award, starting with forty percent of the first $50,000 awarded and
decreasing to a sum equal to fifteen percent of the award above
$600,000.17 In a small proportion of cases involving special difficulty or ease, trial judges would be permitted to award higher or
lower sums for the lawyers. For cases that settle reasonably early
in the litigation process, I propose that a lower proportion of the
award should be added on for legal fees. Although O'Connell's proposed statute provides for the payment of "reasonable attorney's
fees" by defendants to successful plaintiffs, it does not address how
18
to determine that sum.
Weiler falls somewhere between O'Connell and me in terms of
specificity. Although he does not take a firm stand, his tentatively
favored solution seems to be one in which, like mine, the legal fees
would be set as a percentage of the overall award (pp 68-69). The
specific percentage would not vary based on the amount of the
award; instead, it would vary based on the point in the process at
which the case is resolved (for example, fifteen percent if settled
early and thirty-five percent if tried) (p 64). Weiler appears to endorse part, but not all, of my proposal. 9
We disagree over whether the attorney's percentage should be
lower the higher the total amount of the award. The disagreement
turns in large part on our different views of the current market for
plaintiffs' legal services, which I believe is quite imperfect and
Weiler does not. As I see it, most claimants do not shop for lawyers; they see only one, by referral or otherwise, and do not bargain
" This percentage schedule is based on the California rule now in place that limits how
much the plaintiff's lawyer may take out of the plaintiff's award. Cal Bus & Prof Code

§ 6146 (West, Supp 1990).

i O'Connell, 1981 U Ill L Rev at 352 (cited in note 10).
19 He also proposes several nice additional wrinkles to deal with both baseless suits and
frivolous defenses, as well as unreasonable unwillingness by either side to settle during the
process once an offer is made (p 68).
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over price. Of course, even if a small proportion of claimants
shopped well, they might effectively police the market for everyone
else. But I don't think that happens either.
Even when claimants shop among lawyers, frequently through
referrals, I believe that malpractice attorneys try to convince
claimants to employ them through non-price-cutting strategies. If
nothing else, offering a lower price might inadvertently signal to
the would-be client that the lawyer is less qualified. That danger is
especially great in those cases where the plaintiff is highly riskaverse and unable to evaluate either how good the lawyer is or just
what sort of lawyer is needed. Rather, the claimant generally wants
the best lawyer possible, fearing that otherwise the case might be
lost entirely. If I am right that claimants typically select their lawyer on the basis of reputation, 0 the result, in a socially perverse
way, is that the lawyers with the best reputations will tend to get
the easiest and most lucrative cases. Conversely, those with lesser
reputations will handle the harder cases. The best strategy for ambitious and talented lawyers lower down in the pecking order,
then, seems to be to work exceptionally hard in an effort to build a
reputation in the legal community, not to charge a lower fee.
Were there to be negotiations among sophisticated parties for
legal services in malpractice cases, I believe that contracts would
provide for a lower percentage the more recovered, as is apparently
true for real estate agent commissions on sales of homes. This result, I believe, is especially likely in the Weiler-reformed world in
which far more of what the claimant receives would be readily predictable than is true today. Once the attorney makes a strong
enough case for liability, the negotiations over the amount of damages should be less complicated and less difficult than now. Obtaining a large award would much more likely be a function of the
2
plaintiff's actual loss than the attorney's skill. '
D.

Summary, and Likely Impact

In sum, Weiler's first track reform is thoughtful and well argued, even though it is neither as detailed as I would have liked,
"0For some insight into the process, see the story of Chicago's Philip Corboy, one of
America's best-known malpractice lawyers, in John A. Jenkins, The Litigators 315-70
(Doubleday, 1989).
21 By contrast, in the present situation, one could argue that since what the claimant
will get is such a crap shoot, the lawyer might justifiably claim an even larger share the more
he or she is able to obtain through negotiation and/or jury skills. Of course, to admit this
reality is largely to abandon the claim that the current system delivers individual justice
and therefore may make it difficult for plaintiffs' attorneys as a class (staunch defenders of
the system on "justice" grounds) to ask for more the more they win.
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nor terribly original. The areas Weiler addresses are exactly the
ones that legislatures, scholars, and commissions have been working to reform.
The most important quality of Weiler's proposal, in my judgment, is that it is balanced. This balance is in sharp contrast to the
one-sided proposals from the Reagan and Bush Administrations"2
and, as Weiler points out, to the generally one-sided legislation
that states have so far enacted. And Weiler's particular balance, it
must be re-emphasized, would mesh the damages awarded in malpractice cases with malpractice claimants' actual losses far more
sensibly than does the current system.
Given the wide array of legislation enacted by different states
during the past twenty years, Weiler's package would have quite
different meanings from state to state. For example, in those states
that have already reversed the collateral sources rule and capped
pain and suffering awards, or capped total awards (pp 31-32), the
total cost of the system to defendants might actually go up under
Weiler's plan. By contrast, in a regime still embodying the basic
common law rules, Weiler's package should reduce overall costs to
defendants, as well as significantly altering who gets what.
Creating more predictability in awards by imposing a threshold on, and precluding extravagant awards for, pain and suffering
is likely to lead to somewhat reduced administrative costs and to
the elimination of a fair number of weak, modest-injury liability
cases. On the other hand, there is little reason to think that this
sort of package will either end the payment of invalid claims where
there are serious injuries but no malpractice, or increase legitimate
serious injury malpractice claims. And, of course, this package does
not broaden coverage to seriously injured victims of adverse events
in the absence of malpractice.

" For the general views

of the Reagan Administration on tort law reform, see US At-

torney General, Tort Policy Working Group, Report on the Causes, Extent and Implica-

tions of the Current Crisis in Insurance Availability and Affordability (1986) (criticized in
Sugarman, Doing Away at 78-82 (cited in note 10)). For Reagan Administration proposals
aimed specifically at medical malpractice, see Department of Health and Human Services,
Report of the Task Force on Medical Liability and Malpractice (Aug 1987). The views of

the Bush Administration are contained in S 1123, 102d Cong, 1st Sess (Apr 25, 1991), in 137
Cong Rec S 6357 (May 22, 1991). A competing malpractice reform bill now before Congress
is S 1232, 102d Cong, 1st Sess (Jun 3, 1991), in 137 Cong Rec S 7307 (Jun 6, 1991) which
emphasizes binding arbitration of malpractice claims. This bill is discussed in Clark C. Havighurst and Thomas B. Metzloff, S.1232-A Late Entry in the Race for Malpractice Reform, 54 L & Contemp Probs 179 (1991). For yet another approach, see The Health Care
Injury Compensation and Quality Improvement Act of 1991, introduced by Senator
Durenberger in October, 1991.
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In sum, Weiler's package deserves support because, although
it would not likely have a dramatic impact on malpractice insurance premiums, it would distribute money among plaintiffs in what
I consider to be a far more socially desirable way than does the
current system and is not easily labeled pro-plaintiff or prodefendant.23
E.

A Further Idea-Organizational Liability

Although it appears elsewhere in his book, Weiler recommends
yet another change that I think should be included as part of his
track one reform. He calls it "organizational liability" (pp 122-32).
Breathtakingly simple, and exceedingly inventive, organizational
liability means that, for injuries incurred inside health care institutions, mainly hospitals, the institution-not the physician-would
be liable for the physician's malpractice. Victims could not sue
their surgeons or anesthesiologists, for example, but could sue the
hospital instead. The proposal would treat doctors as employees of
hospitals, even when they are, for other legal purposes, only independent contractors.
The direct consequences of organizational liability would be
that doctors could no longer be named as individual defendants,
except in cases concerning malpractice they might commit in their
offices, and they would no longer purchase individual malpractice
insurance to cover torts they commit in hospitals. As Weiler explains, this reform would largely conform medical practice to the
prevailing situation in health maintenance organizations, some university and public hospitals, and other settings where the doctors
are in fact employees of the institution and do not buy their own
malpractice insurance (pp 124-25). While doctors in those other
settings today may actually be named as defendants, everyone involved soon appreciates that any damage or settlement awards will
be paid by the employer or its insurer.
Thus, although the formal common law rule is that employers
who are held vicariously liable for the torts of their employees have
a right of indemnity from their employees, this right simply is not
asserted against negligent employees who impose costs on the organization. The upshot, as Weiler notes, is that doctors would basically be treated the way airline pilots are in cases arising out of
plane crashes (p 125). Pilots are not expected to carry individual
23

Subject to the reservations I have already noted as to some of the details.
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insurance and, whatever the technical legal rights of their employer airlines, airlines simply do not seek indemnity from negligent pilots.
I agree with Weiler that two strong advantages of organizational liability would be that: (1) hospitals could better build medical malpractice costs into the overall cost of patient care than
could doctors (p 127), and (2) physicians would no longer labor
under the fear of an individual judgment against them that they
perceive to be unjust (p 131).24 For those reasons, I applaud and
support this recommendation.
Weiler's own main reservation about his proposal concerns
whether it might lead to more careless conduct by doctors (p 129).
But he concludes that, to the contrary, organizational liability
should actually lead to fewer patient injuries as compared with the
current rule (pp 129-31). Weiler is keenly aware that, although airline pilots don't individually pay tort damages when their carelessness brings about passenger harm, airline liability, at least in theory, translates into the retraining, discipline, or even firing of
negligent employees. Likewise, he envisions that hospitals would
respond to the threatened imposition of organizational liability
with new and more effective behavioral controls over their physicians. As a result, in Weiler's view, organizational liability would
also prove beneficial in preventing accidents.
I am skeptical about these projected safety gains; at the same
time, I am not worried that organizational liability would lead to
more patient injuries. But I want to reserve my discussion of the
question until I take up Weiler's track two no-fault reform proposal, which also contains organizational liability as a component
and depends importantly for its intellectual justification upon the
same alleged safety-promoting features.
III. TRACK Two REFORMS: TOWARD A No-FAULT SYSTEM FOR
MEDICAL ACCIDENTS

A.

The Plan

Most exciting of Weiler's recommendations is his call for a nofault compensation scheme covering all seriously injured victims of
medical treatment. Although he admits that he has not yet worked
out the full details of his proposal, its main features are clear. Any
hospital patient injured by medical treatment who is disabled for
" Of course, malpractice litigation would still focus on whether the doctor acted
carelessly.
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six months or more would be entitled to compensation from the
hospital, regardless of fault (p 136). That compensation would
cover economic losses (such as lost income, lost household production, and medical and rehabilitation expenses) not otherwise covered through broad-based social and first party insurance schemes
(id). It would also include modest payments for non-economic loss
to the severely and permanently disabled, based upon a schedule
that takes into account the victim's age at the time of injury and
the nature of the impairment (p 135).
Weiler is not the first to recommend a no-fault approach to
medical accidents. O'Connell proposed an "elective" no-fault remedy for malpractice problems nearly twenty years ago.25 Professors
Clark Havighurst and Laurence Tancredi, separately and together,
have been promoting various medical no-fault plans for just as
long. 26 Weiler's analysis, however, is the first to claim that it is
both affordable and administratively feasible for no-fault to cover
the full range of patient harms from medical treatment, provided
that coverage is restricted to the most seriously injured.
Previously, it was generally believed (or feared) that it would
too often be too hard or too expensive to tell whether medical
treatment caused the injury. After all, many people leave the hospital worse off than when they entered, not because of something
done to them by their doctor or by hospital employees, but because
their ailment has simply taken a turn for the worse. None of the
advocates of medical no-fault plans believes that a no-fault program should cover those situations. People who die or decline from
the disease or condition from which they suffer on entry are not
the responsibility of the medical establishment. No-fault is meant
to pay only for those patients the system accidentally harms,
whether through malpractice or not. In addition to the causation
problem, it has been feared that it would be much more expensive
than in the current system to compensate all patients who are accidentally injured in the course of medical treatment.
Faced with these causal and fiscal conundrums, medical nofault advocates have tended to favor creating a list of typical injuries that are generally caused by medical accidents and have reasonably well understood financial consequences. The no-fault plan
25

Jeffrey O'Connell, Expanding No-Fault Beyond Auto Insurance:Some Proposals,59

Va L Rev 749 (1973).
"SClark C. Havighurst and Laurence R. Tancredi, "Medical Adversity Insurance"-A
No-Fault Approach to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 51 Milbank Mer
Fund Q 125 (1973).
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would then cover only those things on the list (often called the
"designated compensatory events"). This list might be generated
legislatively to cover all hospitals, or it might be the product of
decentralized market transactions in which individual hospitals
and patients contractually agree that the no-fault plan and not
malpractice law would cover specified injuries.
Weiler argues, however, that the Harvard study reveals two
startling facts that go against the conventional wisdom. First, determining whether a patient is suffering from a medical accident or
not was, in the Harvard study, not so difficult after all. Based upon
expert reviews of medical files, only five percent of the cases were
"close calls" (p 144). So, while there will be hard cases, those situations evidently do not arise very often. Second, even though nearly
fifty times as many patients suffer from medical accidents as recover on malpractice claims (p 134), restricting the no-fault plan to
the less than one-fourth of those victims who are seriously injured
and then compensating them only for their net losses appears to
make the scheme affordable (pp 135-36).
Notice that this "same-cost" assertion assumes that the nofault plan would substitute completely for the tort system, at least
for injuries suffered in a hospital. The implication, then, is that
Weiler's track one proposals are best seen as first step reforms of
the traditional system.
It remains to be seen whether the ease of administration and
affordable cost conclusions would stand up in practice, and the
Harvard study has already run into criticism along these lines.2 7
But I believe that Weiler has made a strong enough showing of his
proposal's potential practicality that the proposal plainly deserves
the more careful study and evaluation that Weiler seeks.
B.

The Likely Impact of Weiler's No-Fault Plan

In order to decide what difference Weiler's no-fault plan
would make, we must compare it to something. The most important comparison, I believe, is to the malpractice system altered by
Weiler's track one reforms discussed above.
Consider, first, the seriously injured who would otherwise have
valid malpractice claims. Because track one reforms would already
restrict them to net economic losses and curtail payments for pain
27 See Maxwell J. Mehiman, The HarvardNo-Fault Project: A Critique (Special Com-

mittee on Medical Malpractice of the New York State Bar Association, 1989); Daniel
Kramer, The Harvard Study, An Analysis, NY L J 1 (Mar 9, 1990).
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and suffering, in most cases their benefit package would not be terribly different under the no-fault plan. First, hospitals would be
liable for pretty much the same net out-of-pocket losses under
both schemes. To be sure, Weiler's no-fault plan would restrict lost
wages to no more than 150 percent of the state average wage (p
137), so that the relatively few no-fault claimants who earn more
would be denied full recovery if they had failed to arrange for disability or life insurance on their own. But, of course, those higher
earners are exactly the people who are most likely to have such
private first party protection anyway.
In addition, the no-fault plan would probably cut back pain
and suffering awards even further. Weiler doesn't acknowledge this
directly, but the language he uses in describing those benefits (p
135) and the workers' compensation analogy he draws upon (p 132)
suggest that would be the case. Whether this result would lower
claimant recoveries to the range I have proposed for tort law, or
even lower, remains to be seen.
In return for these reductions, claimants would be spared the
burden of having to prove malpractice. Assuming the Harvard
Study's findings about the eligibility determination under no-fault
hold up, recovery would become enormously easier for those who
now eventually show enough evidence of malpractice to win a settlement or verdict.
And, of course, no-fault would bring in a large new group of
previously uncompensated claimants who suffer from adverse
events not caused by malpractice. Unfortunately, Weiler does not
make clear just how many new beneficiaries we are talking about,
but it has to be many times the number who are currently compensated for serious injury caused by malpractice.
Most seriously disabled, elderly victims of medical accidents,
now covered by Medicare and Social Security, would likely be eligible for little more than the no-fault plan's pain and suffering
payment, because their uncovered economic losses are likely to be
small. Some, however, would exhaust their Medicare coverage, or
have special needs that no-fault, but not Medicare, would cover,
and would substantially benefit from the plan. Most middle and
professional class people with steady jobs would be largely restricted to recovering the pain and suffering component, because
other insurance would already cover most of their economic losses.
However, some people in those groups do not have adequate health
insurance, rehabilitation coverage, or disability income protection,
and could benefit considerably. If a member of one of these groups
were killed in a medical accident, her heirs might qualify for sub-
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stantial income replacement benefits under the plan, depending on
the extent to which the plan allows duplication of the victim's own
pension and life insurance benefits.
The plan would be of the most help to those people currently
without much first party insurance protection. These individuals
typically include homemakers, children and older students, the
temporarily unemployed, and modest earners employed in the secondary labor force or by small employers without good employee
benefit plans. As Weiler notes, income replacement is especially
important, since, as the Harvard study found, insurance typically
protects only a small portion of lost earnings (pp 136-37).
By paying only after other basic compensation sources have
been expended, Weiler's no-fault medical accident plan would be
far better aimed at real need than are existing auto no-fault and
workers' compensation schemes. Simplifying somewhat, those
schemes, like the traditional tort system, are primary in the sense
that if they and some type of first party insurance both cover the
same loss, the loss falls on the compensation plan and not the insurance. By contrast, just as Weiler wants reformed malpractice
law (in his track one reform) to pay only after "collateral sources"
do, he also wants the medical no-fault plan to pay last.
C.

How the Money Is Redirected

How are all those extra no-fault claims to be funded? There
are three major sources of money. One portion would come from
money saved as a result of lowered recoveries by those who are
covered-lowered both from what Weiler's reformed malpractice
system would pay and from what the current tort system pays.
The second major source of funds would be reduced costs of
claims processing. Weiler believes that, instead of society spending
more than fifty percent of the malpractice premium dollar on administration as is done today, the no-fault plan would reduce
spending to fifteen to twenty percent on claims administration,
more like what is spent in workers' compensation (pp 139, 229 n
38). This savings is to be achieved by employing an administrative
compensation mechanism something like that which Social Security now uses in determining eligibility for disability benefits. Here
Weiler writes somewhat approvingly of a recent proposal of the
American Medical Association to shift medical malpractice claims
to an expert administrative model and away from the current judi-
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cial model (pp 114-22).28 But for Weiler the AMA proposal is much
too timid, as it would retain the basic fault criteria as the entry
point into the system (pp 117-18). Still, Weiler likes the AMA's
idea of using specially trained hearing officers to decide doubtful
cases (pp 115-16). In any event, the aspiration is that the administrative model would drastically reduce the use and cost of lawyers
on both sides. Weiler is quite aware that workers' compensation in
America has not eliminated claimants' lawyers; on the other hand,
their compensation is typically a far lower share of the recovery
than that paid in tort suits. So, whether compared with legal fees
paid for by both sides (as today) or by defendants (as under Weiler's track one reforms), the legal fees under the no-fault plan are
meant to be considerably less.
The third main source of funds to cover new claimants under
the no-fault plan would come from the elimination of malpractice
claims by those without serious injuries (p 136). Of course, many of
those victims are de facto closed out of the current system because
the costs of pursuing their cases, given the prospective recovery,
make lawyers unwilling to take them. Even the payment of plaintiffs' legal fees by defendants under Weiler's reformed tort law is
not likely to cause many more claims to be filed. The AMA's plan,
by contrast, seeks to bring these lesser-injured victims into the system, by providing a lawyer for any claimant with a bona fide claim.
Weiler's no-fault plan, however, not only excludes all the smallerinjury victims from coverage in the no-fault scheme, but also seemingly would deny them their tort rights. Weiler first disavows a position on the "exclusivity" issue (p 134), but then proceeds on a
"same cost" assumption (p 135) which requires exclusivity if all
the costs are to be used up by no-fault.
Weiler's approach to medical no-fault sharply departs from
the American automobile no-fault practice. There, a few states like
Michigan and New York aside, the plan is aimed almost entirely at
small-injury cases, not the seriously injured. Automobile no-fault
benefits are available with little or no deductible and no requirement of serious harm, and they have very low caps, such as
$10,000. The seriously hurt are left to try their luck with tort law.29
" Report

of the American Medical Association/Specialty Society Medical Liability

Project, A ProposedAlternative to the Civil Justice System for Resolving Medical Liability
Disputes: A Fault-Based,Administrative System (AMA, 1988). For wide-ranging analysis
of the AMA proposal, see Symposium: Taking Medical Malpractice Out of the Courts, 1

Cts, Health Sci & L 3 (1990).

29 Department of Transportation, Compensating Auto Victims (May 1985).
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Weiler's medical no-fault is concentrated on the seriously injured.
To keep costs under control, the plan would deny a tort remedy to
anyone injured by a medical accident in a hospital.
I would be far more content to exclude those not seriously injured by medical accidents from both the tort and the medical nofault plan were we to have a stronger social safety net for all Americans who are disabled for six months or less. That means reasonably assured first party health care benefits for lesser disabilities
and well-designed, short term income replacement benefits. Having
such programs in place, I believe, would also make Weiler's plan
politically far more plausible.3 0
IV. TRACK THREE REFORMS: BROADENING THE SOCIAL INSURANCE
NET AND DE-COUPLING PREVENTION AND COMPENSATION

A.

The Comprehensive Compensation Alternative

As are his track one reforms, Weiler's no-fault plan is hospital
based-doctors would not be individually responsible for compensating hospital patients who suffer an accidental injury while under
their care. As before, Weiler's justification is that imposing the
costs on sophisticated organizations like hospitals will promote
safer and more cost-effective medical practice.
Otherwise, Weiler would surely agree that there is no principled basis for advantageously singling out victims of medical accidents for compensation. After all, once fault is abandoned as the
criterion, one cannot very forcefully argue that someone who is injured through the course of medical treatment has a greater entitlement to receiving compensation for his or her losses than does
one who suffers losses directly from illness or birth defect, or by an
accident occurring outside of the hospital.
Indeed, because I believe that all Americans suffering from
disabilities of virtually every cause should have access to a program that takes reasonable care of their medical and related expenses and reasonably replaces their lost wages, I much prefer a
comprehensive compensation solution that does not distinguish
among medical accidents, auto accidents, product injuries, work
accidents and the like. For me, such a solution would rely upon a
'0

For discussions of solutions to the short-term income replacement need, see

Sugarman, Doing Away at 135-36 and 169-72 (cited in note 10); Sugarman, 24 San Diego L
Rev at 808-15 (cited in note 10); and Stephen D. Sugarman, Short-Term PaidLeave: A New
Approach to Social Insurance and Employee Benefits, 75 Cal L Rev 465 (1987).
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broadened Social Security system and increased mandatory employee benefits."
B.

Do We Need Medical No-fault for Accident Prevention?

But what of the claim that we need focused plans, such as
Weiler's medical no-fault scheme, in order to force those who are
in a position to reduce accidents to internalize costs so that the
accident rate will decline? There are two responses to this claim.
The first retort was given by Professor Marc Franklin more
than twenty years ago and reiterated by Professor Richard Pierce
more than ten years ago. 2 As they pointed out, it is quite possible
to imagine a comprehensive compensation scheme that makes no
distinctions among causes of harm on the benefits side, but which
is funded by contributions that vary with the number and severity
of accidents caused by the scheme's funding sources, which, of
course, could include hospitals.
The second retort frontally challenges the prevention claim. A
reduction of medical accidents is better promoted through behavioral control mechanisms that do not depend upon the hospital
having a financial interest in paying out lower no-fault benefits or
making lesser contributions to the compensation fund.3
For one thing, organizational no-fault liability also gives hospitals socially perverse incentives. For example, as is the case of employers under the existing workers' compensation scheme, hospitals will have a strong financial reason to fight claims by arguing
that the claimant's injury was really caused by the condition that
brought the patient to the hospital, and there will be pressure to
organize the information collected at the hospital to lead to this
conclusion. Hospitals are also likely to find it financially attractive
to turn away patients whose health profiles make them most at
risk of medical accidents, and to discourage or forbid the performance of medical treatment that most risks medical accidents-even
when serving the patient and performing the riskier treatment are
the socially desirable behaviors.
On the other hand, hospitals already have considerable incentives to police the conduct of independent contractor physicians,
quite apart from any fear that courts might manipulate existing
31 Sugarman,

Doing Away at 127-52 (cited in note 10).

2 See Marc A. Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selec-

tive Reimbursement, 53 Va L Rev 774 (1967); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Encouraging Safety:
The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regulation, 33 Vand L Rev 1281 (1980).
13 For my general arguments against tort law as an effective deterrent, see Sugarman,
Doing Away at 3-34 (cited in note 10).
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tort doctrine to hold them legally liable for the malpractice of doctors working there. First, a hospital does not want to gain the reputation that its patients are more commonly victims of nalpractice
than patients elsewhere. Second, hospital administrators and
boards are concerned about the care received by patients they
tend; although hospital managers may increasingly think of themselves as running businesses, surely there is still a strong self-imposed moral commitment to good medical care. Anyway, to the extent that business considerations do dominate, I believe that the
changes brought about by recent health care cost containment
pressures also give hospitals an incentive to get their doctors to do
it right the first time. Now if the doctor fouls up and the patient
has to stay longer for more treatment, this longer stay may well
not be paid for by the private or public insurer standing behind
the patient.
This does not mean that all or even most hospitals today adequately supervise doctors practicing there, require retraining for
doctors who need it, or deny privileges to incompetent physicians
when that drastic solution is warranted. But many of the barriers
to such actions would remain under Weiler's no-fault plan, or, alternatively, might be removed quite apart from his plan. For example, Weiler explains that the fear in the health care profession
that a disciplined health professional will invoke antitrust laws
may help explain some of the reluctance by hospitals to act more
aggressively in policing those professionals (pp 111-12).
The Harvard Study sought to develop and analyze new evidence on the impact of tort law on physician behavior through an
econometric study that relied on the fact that the likelihood of being sued for malpractice varies considerably from place to place
within New York state. For reasons not worth trying to detail here,
I am skeptical about this aspect of the Harvard study. Perhaps
more importantly, Weiler himself expresses grave misgivings about
whether the study really proves that malpractice law actually
causes better medical care. Still, he does assert that it is his "judgment" that malpractice law has a "modest ... preventive effect" (p

90).
Yet, if Weiler were right, we should expect to see lower malpractice rates in hospitals that are part of health maintenance organizations, other things being equal, as compared with hospitals
in which independent physicians practice. After all, for the current
malpractice system, HMOs face organizational liability of the sort
Weiler is advocating. But I have seen nothing from the Harvard
study or other research that demonstrates that HMOs or other
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hospitals with employee-physicians in fact do respond with the
greater accident prevention efforts that Weiler's simple economic
model predicts. An important part of the explanation for this lack
of response, I believe, is the very point that Weiler himself emphasizes: a large amount of malpractice actually involves slips of the
hand or momentary inattention that are extremely difficult to
avoid (p 129).11
Moreover, Weiler himself points to new developments on the
regulatory front that hold considerable promise in terms of medical accident reduction quite apart from any cost internalizing
strategy. Simply put, state medical boards are probably better advised to spend more of their resources on requiring hospital risk
management and physician peer review rather than directly investigating and prosecuting doctors themselves (pp 110-11).
To be sure, these boards may not currently have sufficient resources available to them to carry out their regulatory functions as
effectively as we might like. But it would surely seem right to redirect toward regulatory enforcement some of the money that could
be saved by eliminating the administrative costs of determining
causation, as would occur were a comprehensive accident or disability compensation plan substituted for medical no-fault and
other focused plans.
C.

Medical No-fault as a Step

Nevertheless, I can support Weiler's medical no-fault plan, not
as the best long-range solution, but instead as a step toward a
more comprehensive system for compensating the seriously disabled. Taking political reality into account, we would expect to
achieve Weiler's track one reforms sooner than his medical nofault reform. Indeed, medical no-fault might be preliminarily tried
on an elective basis or in a few experimental states, as Weiler suggests, before being applied universally (p 151).
If, however, concurrent-with the track one reforms an expanded temporary disability insurance scheme were adopted and
combined with a strong national health insurance system, then
3' For very recent analyses of the impact of medical malpractice law on the promotion
of safety and the slowing of innovation, see the following essays in The Liability Maze,

Peter W. Huber and Robert E. Litan, eds (Brookings Institution, 1991): Gary T. Schwartz,
Product Liability and Medical Malpractice in Comparative Context 28; Stanley Joel Reiser, Malpractice, Patient Safety, and the Ethical and Scientific Foundationsof Medicine
227; and Laurence Tancredi and Dorothy Nelkin, Medical Malpractice and Its Effect on
Innovation 251.
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people would realize that neither tort law, nor workers' compensation, nor auto no-fault or other no-fault plans such as Weiler's
would need concern themselves with other than the most seriously
injured.
Perhaps in the next stage, then, we might enact a series of
such schemes focusing on the seriously injured-say, for victims of
medical accidents, airplane accidents, prescription drug and vaccine side-effects, organized recreational sporting accidents and the
like, as well as auto and workplace accidents. At that point, however, rather than continuing to add plans covering more and more
specified groups, many might conclude that it would be wiser to
consolidate this proliferation of schemes into a single compensation plan.
Whether we should define that overall plan in terms of accidents as New Zealand has, 35 or even more broadly in terms of the
seriously disabled generally, as I have proposed, could then be debated. By then we should also know more about whether organizational no-fault liability for medical accidents had indeed contributed to patient safety (as Weiler predicts), in which case the
funding of the comprehensive plan might well wish to target those
hospitals experiencing relatively more accidents for larger contributions toward the funding of the comprehensive plan. Or, if, as I
anticipate, we conclude (as New Zealand has so far) that fine tuning on the pay-in side is not really worthwhile, then the comprehensive plan would likely be funded by much broader-based revenue sources.
In sum, viewing both Weiler's track one and track two proposals as steps rather than ends, I find them highly attractive, and, as
such, I very much hope that the prescriptions offered in Medical
Malpractice on Trial gain the support they deserve.

35 For discussions and evaluations of the New Zealand plan, see Terence G. Ison, Accident Compensation (Croom Helm, 1980), and Geoffrey Palmer, Compensation for Incapacity (Oxford, 1979).

